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I. INTRODUCTION
When an attorney represents an interest adverse to that of a
former client, a number of difficult ethical questions arise: will the
confidences of the former client be used to his disadvantage; if not,
will the appearance that those confidences may be used against the
former client undermine the trust upon which the attorney-client
relationship is based? Courts and attorneys confronting these ques-
tins generally look to Canons 4 and 9 of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Code of Professional Responsibility for guidance.'
Although the Code attempts to provide detailed ethical guid-
ance that will aid courts in policing the conduct of the practicing
1. Canon 4 provides that "a lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a
client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY, Canon 4 (as amended Aug. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as ABA CODE]. Canon 9 states that "a lawyer should avoid even the
appearance of professional impropriety." Id. Canon 9.
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bar,2 judicial enforcement of the Code has not been the panacea that
the Code's authors envisioned. The problem of an attorney opposing
a former client is one area that vividly illustrates the difficulty
courts have had in translating the Code's guidance into judicial
standards. Rather than focus on the Code's specific Disciplinary
Rules, courts have seized the attractive but general language of
Canons 4 and 9 as justification for disqualifying attorneys.' As a
result, attorneys and courts confronting the former client question
find the same vague, inadequate guidance the Code was designed
to eliminate. In particular, the appropriate interrelationship be-
tween Canons 4 and 9 remains unclear.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit raised additional questions re-
garding the disqualification of attorneys for opposing former clients
by holding that under some circumstances the disqualified attor-
ney's work product' could be passed on to succeeding counsel., The
disparate tests proffered by the opinions' in that case for determin-
ing when access to the work product would be proper exemplify the
2. The American Bar Association promulgated the new Code because the old Canons
of Professional Ethics failed to provide attorneys with adequate guidance beyond the general
language of the canons themselves. Moreover, the interrelationship between canons was
unclear, and their general language did not prove conducive to disciplinary enforcement. Id.
Preface. In order to provide more specific guidance, the new Code is organized into three
interrelated parts: canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules. The canons, like
their predecessors, are general statements of the standards for professional conduct. The
ethical considerations represent the highest ethical objectives toward which attorneys should
strive in making specific ethical judgments. Finally, the disciplinary rules provide the mini-
mum level of permissible conduct; violation of a disciplinary rule results in mandatory disci-
plinary action. Id. Preliminary Statement. Making no attempt to prescribe specific discipli-
nary procedures or penalties, the Code recognizes that its effectiveness depends upon vigorous
judicial enforcement. Id.
3. See Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Emle Indus. v.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
4. See Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to that
of Former Client, 55 B.U. L. REv. 61 (1975); Note, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney
Opposes a Former Client: The Need for a Realistic Application of Canon Nine, 52 CHi.-KENT
L. REV. 525 (1975); Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-Silver Chrysler
Steers in a New Direction, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 130 (1975).
5. Although difficult to define precisely, attorney's "work product" generally refers to
the attorney's theories and conclusions as reflected in "interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
intangible ways." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). In using the generic term
"work product" to describe the materials with which the Seventh Circuit was concerned,
however, it appears that the Seventh Circuit did not intend to include all types of materials
that are covered by the work product rule of Hickman. The court indicated that the type of
work product to which its opinion was addressed included only "routine lawyer work," a
category that the court apparently considered less inclusive than the Hickman work product
rule.
6. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
rev'g on rehearing 571 F.2d 390.
7. Circuit Judge Pell wrote the majority opinion and Senior Circuit Judge Castle filed
a forceful dissent on this issue.
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effect of inadequate guidance in the disqualification cases.8 The
purposes of this Recent Development are to analyze the effect of the
Seventh Circuit's work product decision on disqualification stan-
dards and to develop a consistent framework for determining
whether access to the work product of an attorney disqualified for
opposing a former client should be allowed. This Recent Develop-
ment urges that in order to provide the effective guidance necessary
for both voluntary compliance and judicial enforcement, the Code
must incorporate those judicial standards that most closely reflect
its standards in this area. Thus the Recent Development proposes
an Ethical Consideration regarding access to work product that re-
flects the ethical concerns underlying Canon 4.
II. DISQUALIFICATION FOR REPRESENTING INTEREST ADVERSE TO THAT
OF FORMER CLIENT
A. Traditional Canon 4 Analysis: The Substantial Relationship
Test
The principal guideline for determining whether an attorney
should be disqualified from representing a client to the detriment
of a former client is Canon 4, which admonishes an attorney to
preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients.' The attorney's
obligation to preserve these confidences continues after his repre-
sentation terminates. 0 Basically, Canon 4 is intended to foster the
trust necessary for full and free disclosure between the client and
his attorney." The attorney's ethical obligation to preserve his
client's confidences and secrets, however, is broader than the evi-
dentiary attorney-client privilege.'" In addition to the confidences
protected by that privilege, Canon 4 applies to "secrets," including
any information that would embarrass or disadvantage the client if
disclosed.'"
Courts attempting to translate Canon 4 into disciplinary action
generally rely on the substantial relationship test formulated in the
pre-Code case, T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures.'4
8. See Part I infra.
9. ABA CODE, supra note 1, Canon 4. Canon 4 combines Canons 6, 11, and 37 of the
old Canons of Professional Ethics. Id.
10. Id. EC 4-6.
11. Id. EC 4-1.
12. Id. EC 4-4.
13. Id. DR 4-101.
14. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Although T.C. Theatre and its progeny, see notes
15-24 infra and accompanying text, preceded adoption of the Code, the analysis developed
in those cases continues to apply under Canon 4. See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc.,
546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976). The substantial relationship test enunciated in T.C. Theatre
was actually formulated to enforce Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which in
part provided: "The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
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The T. C. Theatre test provides for disqualification of the attorney
upon a showing by the former client that the subject matter of the
adverse representation is substantially related to the subject matter
of the prior attorney-client relationship. 5 Upon such a showing a
presumption" arises that confidences were disclosed during the
course of the former representation that bear upon the subject mat-
ter of the present case." In justifying that presumption, the T.C.
Theatre court reasoned that requiring the client to point to actual
confidences reposed in the attorney and their possible value to the
new client would destroy the secrecy necessary to the attorney-client
relationship.'8
The extent to which a court should scrutinize the prior
attorney-client relationship was later clarified in Consolidated
Theaters Inc. v. Warner Brothers Circuit Management Corp." and
United States v. Standard Oil Company.20 Consolidated Theaters
considered an antitrust suit in which an attorney opposed a client
of his former law firm. Although he had never met the client, the
attorney had worked on similar antitrust suits while at the firm and
had been given access to the client's files. Although the former client
could offer no specific evidence of confidential information reposed
in the attorney, the court nevertheless ordered disqualification,
holding that the client need only establish a reasonable inference
that confidences might have passed to the attorney.21 The court
further concluded that it was irrelevant whether any confidential
information actually had been or would be used against the client.2
Standard Oil clarified Consolidated Theaters by explicitly holding
that the client need only show that the attorney had access to sub-
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect
to which confidence has been reposed." 113 F. Supp. at 268. Canon 6 has been incorporated
into Canon 4 of the new Code. See note 9 supra.
15. 113 F. Supp. at 268.
16. Some courts have described this presumption as irrebuttable. These courts have
explained that once a former client establishes that the attorney was previously involved in
matters substantially related to the subject matter of the instant suit, an irrebutable pre-
sumption arises that confidences were disclosed to the attorney regarding those matters. The
attorney, however, would be able to rebut initially the allegation of substantial relationship
between the two matters. See Consolidated Theaters, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Manage-
ment Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1954). Other courts have suggested, however, that the
attorney may rebut the presumption that confidences were disclosed by establishing that he
in fact received no confidential information. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
17. 113 F. Supp. at 268.
18. Id. at 269.
19. 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
20. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
21. 216 F.2d at 924.
22. Id. at 925.
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stantially related material to establish the inference that the attor-
ney received confidences.? The court reasoned that this access rule
was necessary to protect the client from being compelled to reveal
specific confidences in an evidentiary hearing.24 Thus, under tradi-
tional Canon 4 analysis, inquiry into the prior attorney-client rela-
tionship was limited to determining whether the attorney had ac-
cess to material substantially related to the issues in the present
case. Moreover, the former client's burden in showing that the attor-
ney had access did not necessitate disclosure of any confidences or
secrets.
B. Canon 9: Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety
Courts confronting the former client problem since the adop-
tion of the new Code have had to reconsider the T. C. Theatre ap-
proach in light of Canon 9. Canon 9, which did not appear in the-
old Canons,2 provides that "a lawyer should avoid even the appear-
ance of professional impropriety." Generally, the purpose of Canon
9 is to promote public confidence in the legal profession and the
legal system by discouraging conduct that may appear to laymen to
be unethical. 26 Thus, in addition to weighing the interests of the
attorney in seeking clients, the new client in selecting counsel, and
the former client in protecting his confidences, courts must consider
whether Canon 9 requires placing increased emphasis on the public
perception of the legal profession.
One of the first decisions applying Canon 9 to a lawyer opposing
a former client was Emle Industries v. Patentex, Inc.Y In Emle
plaintiff's attorney had previously represented defendant on the
identical issue in another suit.? Although the facts presented a
classic Canon 4 case that could have been resolved by the substan-
tial relationship test alone, the Emle court chose to rely on Canon
9 as well.2 ' Reasoning that the attorney's role in the litigation pro-
23. 136 F. Supp. at 354.
24. Id. at 355.
25. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649, n.19 (2d Cir. 1974)
(observing that, although Canon 36 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics had been inter-
preted as supporting the "appearance of evil" doctrine, it was Canon 9 of the Code that
expressly recognized that doctrine).
26. ABA CODE, supra note 1, EC 9-2.
27. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. Defendant Patentex, Inc. was owned in part by defendant Burlington Industries.
Emle Industries brought suit alleging unlawful manipulation and control of Patentex by
Burlington to improperly acquire and illegally use patents to control prices in the yarn
processing and knitting industry. Plaintiff's attorney had previously defended Burlington on
a counterclaim in another suit alleging the same unlawful manipulation of Patentex. Id. at
564, 565-66.
29. The court emphasized that "[nJowhere is Shakespeare's observation that 'there is
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cess was far too critical and that process far too subtle to permit
even the slightest doubt concerning the attorney's ethical conduct,
the court concluded that Canon 9 required the application of a rule
that prevented even the slightest possibility of the former client's
confidences being used to his detriment."0 The court also refused to
consider any contention that the attorney in fact had not had access
to confidential information because such an inquiry would compel
the former client to describe the very information he sought to pro-
tect." Thus, by holding that Canon 4 coupled with Canon 9 required
that the former client need only establish the slightest possibility
that confidences might be used to his disadvantage, the Emle court
indicated that a showing of something less than a substantial rela-
tionship would be sufficient to obtain disqualification. Moreover,
the client would not be forced to describe any confidential informa-
tion, even if the attorney asserted nonaccess as a defense to disquali-
fication.
Although Emle's broad application of Canon 9 has been fol-
lowed by a number of courts, 32 some recent decisions have at-
tempted to restrict the Canon's potentially limitless scope.33 In
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 3 plaintiffs
attorney previously had been an associate of the law firm represent-
ing defendant. During his tenure at the firm, the attorney's contact
with defendant's legal affairs was limited to research on specific
points of law, writing briefs, and informal discussions on procedural
matters.35 Although stating that Canon 9 required that doubts
should be resolved in favor of disqualification, the Second Circuit
concluded that the Canon was not intended to disrupt the balance
developed under T. C. Theatre and its progeny.36 The court further
concluded that the attorney could rebut the inference that his asso-
ciation with the law firm gave him access to the client's confid-
ences.37 Finally, noting that the client is in the best position to show
that the attorney had such access, the court found that the client's
affidavits to that effect amounted to no more than conclusory state-
nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so,' more apt than in the realm of ethical
considerations." Id. at 571.
30. Id.
31. Id.; Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1975).
32. E.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 236 (2d Cir.
1977); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1976); General Elec. Co.
v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68, 74 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (sufficiently close relationship test).
33. E.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 1975).
34. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
35. Id. at 756.
36. Id. at 757. See Part II(A) supra.
37. 518 F.2d at 757.
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ments and thus refused to disqualify the attorney. 8 Although it is
not clear how far the Silver Chrysler court expected the client to go
in describing the attorney's contact with confidential information,
one court has suggested that the nature of the information should
be described in sufficient detail to permit the court to make a prac-
tical evaluation of its potential significance.39
Thus, review of recent former client disqualification cases re-
veals considerable uncertainty regarding the appropriate interrela-
tionship between Canons 4 and 9. One decision that provides guid-
ance in dealing with Canon 9 is Woods v. Covington County Bank.0
Although Woods was a disqualification case arising solely under
Canon 9 and did not involve the former client problem, the court's
detailed analysis of the mechanics of applying Canon 9 is of general
utility. Noting that disqualification motions commonly are used for
purely strategic purposes, the court warned that an overly broad,
application of Canon 9 could arouse public suspicion by unnecessar-
ily delaying and otherwise frustrating litigation.12 While recognizing
that Canon 9 implies that no proof of actual wrongdoing should be
necessary, the court nevertheless concluded "that there must be at
least a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable
impropriety did in fact occur." 3 Thus, by limiting the application
of Canon 9 to situations in which there has been a showing of a
reasonable possibility that a specific impropriety has in fact oc-
curred, the Woods court struck a balance between the need for strict
ethical standards and the problems created by overzealous enforce-
ment.
These conflicting considerations produced the split between
Emle and Silver Chrysler concerning whether Canon 9 should affect
the traditional Canon 4 approach to disqualification." Although
Emle interpreted Canon 9 as reducing the former client's burden in
Canon 4 disqualification cases, the Woods rationale suggests that
38. The court pointed to an example of the client's affidavits: "[Schreiber] obtained
unmeasurable confidential information regarding the practices, procedures, methods of oper-
ation, activities, comtemplated conduct, legal problems, and litigations of [Chrysler]." Id.
at 757 n.8.
39. Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865,875 (W.D. Wis. 1977). The court
also suggested that the client could try "to persuade the court that there was no way in which
he could adequately describe the nature of the confidences and secrets without disclosing
their content too fully." Id.
40. 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. In Woods a naval reserve attorney had investigated securities fraud allegedly perpe-
trated on returning former POW's. His continued representation of these former POW's while
in private practice was challenged as a violation of Canon 9. Id. at 807-09.
42. Id. at 813.
43. Id.
44. See text accompanying notes 30 & 36 supra.
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Canon 9 need not be applied in Canon 4 cases at all. Application of
Woods to the Canon 4-Canon 9 issue present in Emle and Silver
Chrysler would entail answering one question: does traditional
Canon 4 analysis result in disqualification when there is only a
reasonable possibility that an attorney's conduct violates Canon 4?
If traditional Canon 4 analysis requires disqualification when there
is no more than this minimal showing, then under the Woods ap-
proach any appearance of impropriety has been avoided. In that
event, Canon 9 would add nothing to the T. C. Theatre formula
traditionally used for implementing Canon 4. While the Woods ap-
proach has never been applied by a court considering the interface
between Canons 4 and 9, it is apparent that the answer to the
question posed above should be yes. Traditional Canon 4 analysis
would result in disqualification if the former client can establish a
reasonable inference that the attorney received confidences or se-
crets." Once this inference is established the attorney is disqualified
because the court assumes that there is a reasonable possibility that
he will use those confidences in violation of Canon 4. Thus, under
the Woods rationale, Canon 4 analysis already eliminates any rea-
sonable appearance of impropriety and Canon 9 should not be used
to broaden the scope of the Canon 4 analysis developed in T. C.
Theatre and its progeny.
III. ACCESS To DISQUALIFIED ATORNEY's WORK PRODUCT: First
Wisconsin Mortgage Trust
A. "Taint" of Confidentiality Standard
Until recently, no court had permitted substitute counsel to
have access to the work product" of an attorney disqualified under
Canon 4.47 In First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin
Corp. the Seventh Circuit held that under some circumstances, to
be determined on a case-by-case basis, substitute counsel should be
45. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
46. For a discussion of the First Wisconsin court's definition of the term "work prod-
uct," see note 5 supra.
47. Recently, in IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978), a court authorized an
attorney disqualified under Canon 5 to turn over his work product to substitute counsel. The
considerations relevant in that situation, however, differ from those in the case of a Canon 4
disqualification. Canon 5 provides that "a lawyer should exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client." ABA CODE, supra note 1, Canon 5. Since the attorney's
loyalty to his client is no longer divided after disqualification, the adverse effect to the client
is normally eliminated at that point. Hence, there is no prospect of injury to the client
through use of the disqualified attorney's work product after his departure. Canon 4, on the
other hand, seeks to protect the client's confidences and secrets. As the First Wisconsin court
noted, the prospect of the client being adversely affected by use of those secrets remains as
long as the potentially "tainted" work product is used. 584 F.2d at 216.
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provided access to disqualified counsel's work product." In First
Wisconsin a real estate investment trust (Trust) had been estab-
lished under the sponsorship of defendant corporation. Trust was
advised on its investments by a wholly owned subsidiary of defen-
dant corporation. The law firm of Foley & Lardner served as general
counsel to Trust, defendant corporation, and its subsidiaries. Trust
was jointly involved in a number of loan transactions with defen-
dant First Wisconsin National Bank, one of the corporation's sub-
sidiaries. Two years after Trust was established, a series of loan
defaults occurred when the borrowers experienced financial diffi-
culty. After trying to work out the loan problems between Trust and
defendant corporation, Foley & Lardner withdrew as general coun-
sel for Trust and recommended that Trust retain separate counsel
to deal with the problem loans. The Foley firm continued to repre-
sent defendant corporation and analyzed the approximately 300 real.
estate investment transactions in controversy. After failing to re-
solve the loan problems through negotiations, Trust filed suit charg-
ing defendant corporation and its subsidiaries with federal securi-
ties violations."
Upon the filing of the suit, the Foley firm requested that Trust
consent to Foley's representation of defendants. Trust refused and
moved for disqualification, alleging violations of Canons 4 and 9."
Applying the substantial relationship test,"1 the court disqualified
Foley & Lardner because the firm was present at the meetings dur-
ing which the investments were discussed and had advised Trust
with respect to those investments.52 Shortly after disqualification,
defendant's new counsel entered into informal negotiations with
Trust regarding access to the loan analyses previously prepared by
Foley.53 When these negotiations proved fruitless defendant for-
mally moved the court for authorization to request the Foley firm
for access to the work product. The district court denied that mo-
tion54 and a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. 5
48. 584 F.2d at 202.
49. Id. at 202-03.
50. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F. Supp. 493, 495 (E.D. Wis.
1976). Although Trust did not cite Canons 4 and 9, it alleged a prior representation substan-
tially related to the subject matter of the pending suit and an appearance of impropriety. Id.
51. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
52. The court stated: "Foley & Lardner, as part of the legal services it furnished the
Trust, was present at the meetings when the Advisor consulted with the Trustees and fur-
nished them with advice and recommendations with respect to the making, the acquiring,
the holding, and the disposition of the investments." 422 F. Supp. at 497.
53. 584 F.2d at 203.
54. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
55. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, rev'd, 584 F.2d 201 (7th
Cir. 1978).
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On en banc rehearing, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court and three-judge panel, granting access to the work product in
question."6 The court reasoned that denial of access unfairly pun-
ished the client for the attorney's indiscretion. The court further
reasoned that the practical effect of denial of access would be to
place the client in the difficult position of having to dismiss his
attorney upon a motion to disqualify or incur the risk of automati-
cally losing the attorney's predisqualification work product.7 Thus,
concluding that access should be analyzed separately from disquali-
fication, the court suggested that the inquiry be whether transfer of
the work product resulted in "any taint of confidentiality or other
improper advantage" gained from the prior representation." More-
over, the court concluded that the former client seeking to deny
access is in the best possible position to point out those aspects of
the prior relationship, especially confidences and secrets, that might
reflect on the current litigation."9
Characterizing the loan analyses as "routine lawyer work" that
any competent attorney could produce and noting that Trust had
not challenged defendant's contention that preparation of the ana-
lyses was not influenced by confidential information, the court
found that the work product had no "taint" of confidentiality and
that defendant's access to this product would create no unfair ad-
vantage. 0 Thus the First Wisconsin majority analyzed the access
question in terms of litigation advantages rather than in terms of
the Canon 4 and Canon 9 considerations underlying disqualifica-
tion. The majority also placed a greater burden on the former client
by requiring him to describe more fully the confidential information
in question than had prior courts applying traditional disqualifica-
tion analysis."
B. Reasonable Possibility of Confidentiality Standard
Although the First Wisconsin dissent" agreed that disqualifica-
tion and access should be analyzed separately, the dissent argued
that analysis of the access question should focus on the same ethical
56. 584 F.2d at 211.
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id. at 209 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. The court noted that this might be done in camera. Id.
60. Id. at 204.
61. See text accompanying notes 23-24 & 31 supra. But see notes 38-39 supra and
accompanying text.
62. The opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Castle concurred with the majority insofar as
it held that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal but dissented on the merits. 584
F.2d at 211.
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factors considered in disqualification analysis. 3 The dissent con-
tended that the majority, by trying to draw fine ethical lines based
upon the content of the work product, had in fact adopted an ap-
proach to judicial enforcement of ethics that has been repeatedly
rejected." The dissent also criticized the majority's suggestion that
the former client should point out the confidences used in the work
as being a direct reversal of the burden of proof in Canon 4 cases.,'
After noting that traditional Canon 4 analysis is directed at elimi-
nating the possibility of an attorney using confidential information
against a former client," the dissent concluded that granting access
to a disqualified attorney's' work product based upon a failure of
the client to show specific use of confidential information under-
mines the purpose of disqualification." Instead, the dissent sug-
gested that Canon 4 analysis requires that access cases should turn
upon "whether there exists a reasonable possibility of confidential.
information being used in the formation of, or being passed to sub-
stitute counsel through, the work product in question."" Apply-
ing this test to the First Wisconsin facts, the dissent concluded
that there was a reasonable possibility that the work product had
been affected by confidential information since the Foley firm had
prepared these analyses with the instant issues in mind and had
had the opportunity to sit in on discussions and decisions relevant
to those issues."
Although the dissent's reasonable possibility standard sounds
very much like a reformulation of the substantial relationship test, 0
the dissent maintained that application of the standard would not
result in per se preclusion of access in every disqualification case.7 1
The dissent pointed to two examples in which there would be little
or no possibility that confidences or secrets could be used against
the former client. One example, focusing on timing, is when the
conflicting representation arises after the work product has been
63. Id. at 214-15.
64. Id. at 213.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 214.
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id. at 217.
69. Id. at 217-18. The dissent specified some of the confidential information that might
be embodied in the work product:
One example of confidential information which possibly could be passed through the
work to substitute counsel is, given that some of the underlying claims are grounded in
securities law, that Foley & Lardner knew the reaction of plaintiff's Trustees to specific
loan offerings and the amount of their reliance upon the representations of defendants
in relation thereto. Foley & Lardner could have used those insights in determining what
facts in the loan files were important and should be highlighted in the analyses.
Id. at 218 (emphasis in original).
70. See notes 14-24 supra and accompanying text.
71. 584 F.2d at 216.
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produced. 72 The other example, focusing on the type of work in
question, is when the work is so ministerial in nature and so easily
available that no measurable disadvantage to the client could re-
sult.7" Thus, in spite of differing views of the relevant policy consid-
erations, both the majority and dissent in First Wisconsin would
authorize access to a disqualified attorney's work product in some
Canon 4 situations.
IV. ANALYSIS OF ACCESs STANDARDS
Although the Seventh Circuit's decision to grant access to the
work product of an attorney disqualified under Canon 4 recognizes
that automatic preclusion of such access is unnecessarily harsh, the
court's taint of confidentiality standard for determining when to
grant access may be unworkable. Moreover, the practical effect of
the First Wisconsin decision could be to undermine the purpose of
the attorney's disqualification. First, the court's willingness to use
the term "work product" in its decision and analysis makes its
potential effect too broad. Imprecise language such as "work prod-
uct" could be seized as justification for granting access to material
considerably more complex than the court intended. The court's
attempt to qualify use of that term by characterizing the work prod-
uct as "routine lawyer work" is not helpful. "Routine lawyer work"
could include material ranging from interrogatories to deposition
schedules, all of which would be products of the attorney's legal
conclusions and strategy, and some of which might embody the
attorney's special insight into the former client's operations.
Second, and more importantly, the First Wisconsin decision to
require the former client to bear the burden of pointing to the con-
fidences that taint the work product contravenes the purpose of
Canon 4 by forcing him to disclose the confidence he seeks to pro-
tect. Moreover, there is little justification for imposing this burden
on the former client because it is unlikely to aid significantly a judge
attempting to determine whether the work product is tainted. In
most cases, the former client will be unable or unwilling to make the
showing necessary to establish that the work product is tainted. In
some cases, the client will be unable to recall exactly what specific
confidences have been reposed in the attorney or unable to discern
the significance of those that he can recall. In other cases, not know-
72. The court pointed to the scenario in which a law firm representing one party hires
a lawyer who had access to confidences or secrets of the other party that are substantially
related to the pending litigation. If that attorney is hired after substantial work product has
been generated, then the work product generated before his arrival cannot possibly be influ-
enced by the confidences or secrets to which he had access. 584 F.2d at 216.
73. Id.
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ing exactly what is contained in the work product because it has
been privileged from discovery, the former client will be unwilling
to submit a list of all the confidence or secrets that might have
influenced the attorney's work.
Last, it is unfair to grant access based solely upon the former
client's failure to show that the work product was tainted because,
without a showing that the product is not tainted, the possibility
that confidences were used still exists. A defendant's contention
that no confidential information could possibly have influenced the
work product does not dispose of that possibility. Since neither the
defendant nor his new attorney has had access to the work product,
they cannot know that no confidential information was used. Thus
the possibility that the disqualified counsel subconsciously used his
former client's confidences or secrets in preparing the work product
remains.
V. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE ACCESS QUESTION
The question whether a court should grant access to a disquali-
fied attorney's work product must be analyzed consistently with
Canon 4. Canon 4 is directed at preserving the confidences and
secrets of the client at all times. The attorney must be guided by
that principle whether or not he is currently opposing the interests
of a former client or has in fact withdrawn or been disqualified from
such representation. Thus a court ordering access to such an attor-
ney's work product must be equally attentive to the underpinnings
of Canon 4. Moreover, in balancing the policies relevant to deter-
mining the access issue, ethical considerations should carry consid-
erably more weight than the tactical advantages denial of access
would confer.7 4 Courts have at their disposal sufficient means of
74. The ethical considerations relevant to the access question are fundamental to the
attorney-client relationship and this should never be outweighed by a given litigant's interest
in obtaining access to avoid the setback of having the work redone. Granting access when
there is still the possibility that a client's confidences may be used against him results in
permanent injury to the attorney-client relationship by discouraging free disclosure by the
client to his attorney. Even though the party seeking access suffers some delay and expense,
all litigants are benefited by preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship. It is
incumbent upon the courts to prevent the short-term interests of individual litigants from
overriding the long-term interests of the legal system. Moreover, the loss that a party suffers
when a court decides that ethical considerations warrant denial of access can be mitigated
to some extent. First, the litigant can obtain a substantially similar work product from the
substitute attorney. Second, the litigant may not be required to compensate the attorney for
the work he cannot use as a result of the attorney's ethical violation. Although the question
whether an attorney should be denied compensation for work that is rendered useless because
of an ethical violation is beyond the scope of this Recent Development, a discussion of
compensation of attorneys disbarred or suspended during litigation can be found in 24
A.L.R.3d 1193.
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controlling unfair tactical advantages in the adversary process;" it
is unnecessary to place clients in a position that their confidences
and secrets may be used against them. In the long run, all litigants
should benefit from preserving the confidentiality of the attorney-
client relationship.
Courts searching for the proper standards for implementing
Canon 4 should look to the traditional Canon 4 analysis developed
in T. C. Theatre, Consolidated Theatres, and Standard Oil." Those
cases establish a presumption that an attorney has obtained confid-
ences with regard to a given issue upon a showing by the former
client that the attorney worked for the client on matters substan-
tially related to those of the adverse representation. The attorney
may avoid the establishment of that presumption by convincing the
court that he did not have access to substantially related material.
If he fails to sustain that burden of persuasion, the attorney is dis-
qualified. The justification for disqualification is that the attorney,
having had access to confidences that substantially relate to the
issues in the present case, might inadvertently let those confidences
influence his preparation of the case.
After an attorney is disqualified because he might inadvert-
ently use confidences against a former client, a court should not
grant access to any material that those confidences might have
affected. The dissent in First Wisconsin suggested that this determi-
nation should turn upon whether there is a reasonable possibility
that confidences may have been used-in the formation of the work
product. Although the dissent's test correctly identifies the ethical
considerations underlying Canon 4, it fails to provide guidelines for
determining whether that possibility exists with regard to a specific
collection of materials. Proceeding from the premise that the attor-
ney might subconsciously have used confidences in his preparation
of the case, the court should examine the requested material and ask
two questions: first, was the work product generated at a time when
the attorney could have been influenced by the former client's con-
fidences; and second, is the material in question a product of the
attorney's judgment, impressions, or strategy?7 If the answer to
75. See, e.g., ABA CODE, supra note 1, DR 1-102(A)(5).
76. See Part II(A) supra.
77. This approach would place the burden of going forward with the evidence on the
moving party. In cases in which the former client has moved to enjoin access, that burden,
of course, would fall upon him. The burden of producing evidence under this approach,
however, would not require the former client to show or describe any confidences or secrets.
Instead, the former client would be required to show that the challenged material was a
product of the attorney's judgments, impressions, or strategy. The party opposing the motion
to enjoin access would then attempt to show that the material was not a product of the
attorney's subjective thought processes.
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both of those questions is in the affirmative, then the court must
presume that the material has been influenced by the attorney's
knowledge of his former client's confidences and secrets and must
deny access."'
In order to provide guidance to future courts and to attorneys
facing the former client dilemma, the Code should incorporate those
standards that most effectively achieve the purpose of Canon 4.
That purpose, preserving the confidences of the client, has been
most effectively achieved in those cases that have sought to protect
against any reasonable possibility that the client's confidences may
be used to his disadvantage. In the access context, this approach
requires a court to focus on the material in question to determine if
it is the type of work that may embody those cbnfidences that the
disqualified attorney is presumed to have received from his former
client. In order to incorporate these standards into the Code, this
Recent Development urges that the American Bar Association
adopt Proposed Ethical Consideration 4-7:
EC 4-7 An attorney who withdraws or is disqualified from rep-
resenting a client because of the possibility that he may use the
confidences or secrets of a former client to the former client's
disadvantage should not provide substitute counsel, or any other
person opposing the interest of his former client, with material
that is the product of his judgment, impressions, or strategy.9
EDWARD S. ANNUNZIATO
78. The presumption is really no more than a finding that a reasonable possibility of
inadvertent use exists.
79. The purpose of Canon 4 could be achieved in the federal courts through adoption
of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that imposes the same standard:
Proposed Federal Rule 87: A court should not authorize access to any material that is
the product of the judgment, impressions, or strategy of an attorney who withdraws or
is disqualified from representing a client because of the possibility that he may use the
confidences or secrets of a former client to the former client's disadvantage.
1979] 833

